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A u t h o r  
McDonald, P.  
A b s t r a c t  
Survey evidence finds a wage premium for married men over single in most of the western world. 
Three key theories are put forward as an explanation: 1) marriage makes men more productive 
and therefore increases their wages; 2) men with higher labour-market productivity, and therefore 
higher wages, are more likely to be married; 3) employers simply favour married men over 
unmarried. We use a two-step analysis to test these three theories. In the first step, we analyse 
national panel data from Switzerland to pinpoint the part of the penalty due to either productivity 
or selection. We use entropy balancing to match never-married men to married on a set of pre-
labour market covariates, thus isolating the selection effect, before we perform fixed effects 
regressions for productivity effects and to uncover any unexplained residual. We find a premium 
for married men of 5%, much of which is explained by selection. Next, we seek to uncover employer 
preferences by using a factorial survey experiment among HR managers (N = 714) in Switzerland. 
We ask the managers to assign wages to the CVs of fictional job candidates, who vary randomly 
on their civil status, amongst other characteristics. We can therefore identify employers’ 
preferences concerning married and unmarried men. We find that recruiters assign a small premium 
to married men, contingent on the job applied for. Overall, the premiums we find are lower than 
those previously reported in the literature. 
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1. Introduction 
In most western countries, married men earn more than unmarried. This premium is 
substantial – empirical studies show a bonus offered to married men of up to 20% in the US 
(Korenman and Neumark 1991, Chun and Lee 2001, Cohen 2002), 10% in Australia (Breusch 
and Gray 2004), and 10-15% in European countries (Gupta et al. 2007, Barg and Belbo 2007).  
Three main mechanisms may explain the marriage premium. First, productivity: married 
men may work harder and longer because they have wives at home to take care of the domestic 
work, or because marriage makes them more responsible than bachelors. Second, selection: 
good workers with strong labour market chances make better husbands. Finally, the premium 
may come from employer preferences: employers prefer to hire married men because they 
believe the aforementioned characteristics will result in them being more reliable workers, 
whether this is the case or not, or because social norms suggest it is better to hire married men. 
These effects can be difficult to measure through surveys, and residuals often remain after 
taking productivity and selection into account. We propose to use data from a survey 
experiment to tap into employer preferences. 
The aim of this paper is to elucidate on the marriage premium for men through the 
combination of a panel data analysis and a factorial survey. We use data from a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey to conduct fixed effects regression to identify the existence 
of a male marriage premium in Switzerland, using matching to differentiate selection effects 
from productivity and, possibly, employer preferences. To further analyse this latter effect we 
use the results of a vignette study, where a sample of 714 recruiters were shown fictional job 
candidate profiles and asked to indicate the likelihood they would invite a candidate to a job 
interview, and their wage if they were to be hired. The vignettes contain a set of randomly 
varying dimensions, including gender, marital status, and age, that enable us to identify the 
effect of marriage on men’s wages. 
Our analysis is focused on Switzerland. The Swiss labour market shares the strong 
vocational education system and concertation between the education sector and employers’ 
associations of Germany, Austria, and Denmark, but has looser employment protection and 
fewer parental leave entitlements, more in line with the liberal labour markets of the US and 
UK.  
The contribution of this paper is to combine the analysis of longitudinal population 
surveys with a factorial experiment among recruiters – this is the first study to our knowledge 
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that uses a factorial survey experiment to analyse the male marriage wage premium. In this way 
we can provide insight from both the employer and employee perspective. Our factorial survey 
is also unique in that it focuses on the members of a cross-industry human resources 
professional association, where we question recruiters across the Swiss labour market, rather 
than focusing on one sector, or using students as the target of the survey. The experimental 
design, where we control all the inputs and completely randomise the dimensions presented to 
the respondents, go some way towards meeting the requirements of a causal research design. 
Finally, by presenting fictive CVs to active recruiters, we are able to analyse more detailed 
information about the hiring process, albeit information gleaned from a hypothetical setting. 
We can therefore also observe an important but little-analysed part of the job search and 
recruitment process – the initial sorting and judging of CVs, and how recruiters and employers 
react to information on family status at first sight. 
In the following section, we will present the competing theoretical explanations for the 
male marriage wage premium. Section 3 discusses our data, and sections 4 and 5 present the 
results and analysis of the panel studies and factorial survey respectively. We conclude with a 
discussion of our findings in section 6. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
The sociological and economic literature posits three main theoretical explanations for 
the existence of a marriage premium for men: the specialisation or productivity theory, the 
selection theory, and the employer preferences theory. We discuss these theories in turn in order 
to form our hypotheses. 
 
2.1 Productivity 
The productivity theory argues that marriage makes men more productive and therefore 
grants them higher wages. Historically, the key pillar of the productivity theory was household 
specialisation, which for many years was the most widely accepted explanation of the marriage 
premium for men. It argues that married men are more productive than unmarried men and are 
better remunerated as a function of their productivity. This stems from the idea that married 
men “specialise” in paid work, because they have wives at home who specialise in unpaid 
domestic work (Becker 1973). Conversely, unmarried men are expected to do both and 
therefore will have less time and energy to devote to their jobs. For women, the theory is 
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inversed: after marriage, they will be expected to undertake more domestic duties and therefore 
devote themselves less to paid work. Their wages are reduced in function of this expected lower 
productivity. 
 While household specialisation is no longer considered the key reason for the male 
marriage premium, the productivity theory offers further explanations. Productivity may also 
be improved by behavioural changes in married men stemming from the belief that husbands 
have a responsibility to provide for their wives and families. A qualitative analysis of the 
marriage premium in Russia finds that married men assume a persona of masculine 
responsibility, meaning they are more likely to take employment more seriously than non-
married men (Ashwin and Isupova 2014: 52). Thompson and Walker (1989: 852) suggest that 
married men, particularly from the working class, see it as their duty to provide for the family 
and therefore will work harder to preserve a job, or toil longer in unfavourable working 
conditions. Additionally, married men may be more productive simply because they are happier 
and healthier than single men. While empirical evidence shows that married people may 
exercise less and are more prone to obesity than unmarried (Smith and Christakis 2008), there 
is nevertheless ample evidence to show married men are, overall, happier and healthier than 
unmarried, and that marriage has a more positive effect on men’s health than women’s.  
(Kiecolt-Glaser & Newton 2001). Married men, on average, have greater life satisfaction, are 
less prone to substance abuse and other high-risk behaviours (Umberson et al. 2010), and can 
make use of “communal coping” mechanisms to better address ill health (Lewis et al. 2006). 
These improved health outcomes combined with greater senses of responsibility amongst 
married men may lead to employees who are more productive at work than before they were 
married. 
Notwithstanding that the traditional male-breadwinner model is on the wane in much of 
the western world, there is some evidence of a productivity effect in empirical studies in the US 
(Korenman and Neumark 1991; Gorman 1999; Chun and Lee 2001; Killewald and Gough 
2013), Australia (Breusch and Gray 2004), China (Hughes and Maurer-Fazio 2002), and 
Germany (Barg and Belbo 2007), though the strength of this evidence varies from study to 
study. The strongest results come from large-sample panel studies. At the same time, some 
research suggests the productivity theory is losing some of its validity, or that indeed it was 
much less important than imagined. Budig and Lim (2016: 1037) argue that marriage premiums 
are higher for millennials, but that they are gender-neutral (with the premium going to the 
breadwinner irrespective of gender), and that single-earner households are generally 
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economically disadvantaged in comparison to those where both partners work. Hersch and 
Stratton (2000: 90-91) analyse the time men spend doing housework, rather than paid work, 
and find that it changes little between married and unmarried men (though the nature of it does). 
However, this explanation does not discount the improved health and responsibility thesis.  
 
The productivity theory brings us to our first hypothesis: 
H1 (productivity): Marriage results in higher productivity for men, which is rewarded by higher 
wages. 
 
2.2 Selection 
The selection theory suggests that rather than marriage being a signal of increased 
productivity, it is more productive men who get married in the first place. Characteristics that 
make men good workers, such as higher education, motivation, strong social networks and even 
more attractiveness and better physical health, make them better marriage prospects. These 
men, therefore, should earn more regardless of whether they are married or not, but by nature 
of their characteristics are more likely to be selected into marriage in the first place.  
Empirical evidence on selection is mixed. In Germany, Barg and Beblo (2007: 70) use 
a matching approach to study the selection theory of the marriage premium, and find that about 
half of the 9% wage premium for married men is due to a positive mix of characteristics in 
married men. Petersen et al. (2011: 300), in a study of Norway, find that most of the premium 
for married men is present before marriage – suggesting that more productive men are indeed 
more likely to get married, rather than marriage being the cause of productivity improvements. 
Economic research in the US has pointed to selection being the key driver of the male marriage 
premium (Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001, Chiodo and Owyang 2002) with even perceptions of 
“beauty” in male candidates having an impact on their job prospects (Hamermesh and Biddle 
1994). A study of the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth from Ludwig and Brüderl 
(2018: 747, 757) suggests that about half of the male marriage premium comes from selection 
– making a distinction between men on higher wage “tracks” and men with higher earnings 
potential, both of which favour married men, while Killewald and Lundberg (2017: 1025), 
analysing marriages and divorces using the same data, find no evidence of a causal effect of 
marriage on wages, suggesting that the premium is rather due to men marrying when they are 
already on an increasing wage trajectory.  On the other hand, Chun and Lee (2001: 318) analyse 
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data from the Current Population Survey in the US, and find that selection does not explain the 
penalty in any way. Ginther and Zavondy (2001: 326-327) test the selection hypothesis using 
the novel approach of analysing “shotgun” (unplanned) weddings brought on by unexpected 
pregnancy. By assuming that shotgun weddings are a random event the authors also assume 
that such marriages are random and therefore not subject to selection. By comparing the 
marriage premiums of men in shotgun marriages with those married more “conventionally”, 
they find a difference in the marriage premium of only 10% in favour of the traditionally 
married, suggesting that selection plays only a small part in the premium. 
In sum, it seems that selection could offer an explanation for the male marriage premium 
but depending on the type of data analysed and the geographical context, estimations of its size 
(or its existence at all) vary widely. Part of this comes from its difficulty to measure – estimating 
a selection effect requires either the use of counterfactual analysis or ample data in order to 
estimate the change in wages before and after marriage. There nevertheless remains enough 
evidence to argue that selection does account for at least some of the premium, but that neither 
it nor productivity may be enough to account for it all. We must turn then to the question of 
employer preferences.  
 
The empirical and theoretical literature on selection brings us to a second hypothesis: 
H2 (selection): Men are positively selected into marriage, resulting in higher wages for married 
men irrespective of productivity changes.  
 
2.3 Employer preferences 
A third possibility for a marriage premium is the preference of employers for married 
men over other candidates. Sociology has long been sceptical of the notion that wages are 
decided purely on questions of productivity. Besides power resources, other factors such as 
employers’ tastes and employees’ personalities may come into play. 
In terms of the marriage premium, employer favouritism could take on two forms in 
particular. First, it may be that employers simply prefer married men – perhaps they believe 
that married men are more reliable or feel the need to offer them a “family wage”. Employers 
may also have greater affinity with married men: with married men over-represented in 
positions with hiring and firing power, they may simply hire the profiles closest to their own. 
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Employers could prefer married workers because they are less likely to cause unrest – a married 
man is perceived to have more to lose when losing a job and therefore will be less likely to join 
a union, participate in a strike, or otherwise put his job in danger (Schwartz 1990: 69). The 
second possibility is that employers and managers believe in the specialisation theory and 
expect married men to be the most productive workers, but overshoot the actual productivity 
difference (if there is one at all). 
It is important to underline here that employers may not necessarily express their 
preferences in terms of wages, and may instead do so by hiring married men more often than 
single men. England and Farkas (1986: 125-126) point out that employers have “imperfect 
information” about prospective job candidates before they hire them and must therefore use 
what information they do have to screen applicants, and that this often strays into statistical 
discrimination when it encompasses such characteristics as age, sex, and marital status. If it is 
true that employers do prefer married men over unmarried, they should be expected to express 
this in terms of their hiring behaviour as well as (or in place of) their wage-setting patterns. 
Measuring employer preferences is difficult, especially in traditional employment 
surveys. Doing so usually involves the analysis of firm-level hiring data, experiments, and 
correspondence studies, where fictive job applications are sent for real openings – the drawback 
being that this method can only ascertain if a given profile would be invited to a job interview. 
Perhaps as a result of this difficulty in ascertaining authoritative data, there are relatively few 
empirical studies of the male marriage premium with a focus on employer preferences. One 
paper that comes close is that of Bygren et al. (2017), which uses an audit study in Sweden to 
uncover evidence of employer preferences for hiring fathers. They find no evidence of 
systematic preferences for fathers, though it is important to note that the mechanisms behind 
the fatherhood and marriage premiums may differ, and that while the analysis can draw 
conclusions in terms of hiring, it cannot for wages.  
Other studies of employer preferences focus on the gender gap more widely (see, for 
example, Carlsson 2011, Bielby and Baron 1986), but there are few studies focusing on 
employer preferences for married men. The empirical evidence is therefore inconclusive but 
suggests that there may indeed be a premium for married men linked to employers’ preferences, 
especially if it follows the trends of other gender-based employer preferences demonstrated in 
the literature. However, to confirm the existence of a premium caused by employer preferences 
a more complete analytical strategy is required. It is here where this paper makes one of its key 
contributions, which will be elaborated further in the following section. 
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The discussion of the employer preferences theory brings us to a third and final hypothesis: 
 
H3 (employer preferences): Employers prefer married men to unmarried, and will therefore 
offer married men higher wages. 
 
3. Institutional context, data and method 
3.1 Country 
Our paper uses data from Switzerland. Switzerland combines the dual 
education/apprenticeship system, strong links between education and employment, and 
industry-level wage bargaining common in central European countries such as Germany and 
Austria. However, lower levels of worker protection and less generous family allocations move 
it closer to more liberal economies such as Britain and the United States. While the women's 
employment rate is amongst the highest in OECD nations, the country also has one of the 
highest rates of female part-time employment, partly due to strong normative expectations for 
women to act primarily as child-rearers and housekeepers, with men expected to be the primary 
breadwinner for their family (Levy 2013, Valarino and Gauthier 2016). All this leads us to the 
expectation that employer preferences should weigh quite strongly on providing generous 
premiums for married men. 
 
3.2 Data 
Longitudinal survey 
We examine the existence of a male marriage premium by using a panel study based in 
Switzerland. The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) contains 17 annual waves between 1999 and 
2015 (Voorpostel et al. 2016). It contains a large number of socio-demographic variables as 
well as information on employment and wages.  
 We restrict our dataset to men aged 25 to 50, who were unmarried at their first 
observation. This age means we generally cover early careers without too much interference 
from those still in education (Swiss apprentices or interns may still report wages), and cover 
the first marriage of the vast majority of individuals who will eventually marry. We further 
restrict our analyses to men employed as wage-earners who have reported wages across at least 
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two waves, in order that we can run individual fixed-effects regressions for each of the 
individuals. In order to carry out the entropy balancing matching procedure outlined in the 
method section, we must also disregard all person-years for which we do not have observations 
(actual or imputed) for all the variables we use to carry out the matching. Ultimately, these 
restrictions leave us with 628 persons and 3413 person-years, an average of 5 observations per 
respondent. 
 
Survey experiment 
Factorial survey experiments, or vignette studies, are a common analytical tool in many 
branches of social science (Rossi & Nock 1982, Jasso 2006) that have until recently been little 
used to study employer preferences. Since the early 2000s researchers have begun to utilise this 
method more frequently for these kinds of questions (e.g. de Wolf and van der Velden 2001, 
Di Stasio 2014, Liechti et al. 2017). 
 Factorial surveys can be used to effectively simulate the hiring process, by presenting 
employers with vignettes that resemble the CVs of applicants, but which vary key dimensions 
of the profiles. Vignette studies have two key advantages over traditional surveys when 
analysing employer preferences. First, by randomly varying several attributes, respondents are 
less likely to identify the changes and should therefore provide responses that are less prone to 
social desirability bias (Auspurg & Hinz 2014). 
 Second, because factorial surveys use an experimental design, the researcher fully 
controls what is presented to respondents. This removes the possibility of unobservable 
characteristics being correlated to marriage such as personality traits and work attitudes, 
meaning that unlike traditional surveys, factorial surveys satisfy the requirements of 
experimental design. 
 Vignette studies are not without drawbacks: they present hypothetical information 
rather than real events, and can at best be considered stated intentions. This means that while 
internal validity is strong, their external validity is weaker.  These problems are amplified when 
the target population is a randomly drawn sample of adults or students, rather than professionals 
in the field. 
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Our experimental design 
Our factorial survey experiment nullifies the last of these issues by surveying human 
resources managers. We targeted a large association of human resources professionals with 
over 4500 members in Switzerland. These HR professionals received a link to a web survey in 
2016. 714 individuals responded for a response rate of about 16%, which is at a similar level to 
other large-scale experiments of a similar nature (e.g. Liechti et al. 2017). As well as the 
vignettes themselves, we collected information about the respondents. 63% were female and 
37% male, close to the 60%-40% split in the HR profession in Switzerland overall, with an 
average age of 46. 70% responded to the survey in German and 30% in French, approximately 
mirroring the linguistic split in Switzerland.1 93% had been actively involved in recruiting in 
the last 12 months, meaning our survey did indeed target recruiters.2 Respondents were 
concentrated in urban areas, with Zurich and Bern especially overrepresented, and workers in 
large organisations making up over half of the respondents.3 
 The recruiters were told that our study sought to understand different hiring practices 
across Swiss regions. Three different job vacancies were described, with each vacancy followed 
by 4 vignettes – 12 in total per respondent. We selected three occupations – an accountant, a 
HR assistant, and a building caretaker (“concierge”) – that in Switzerland are not male- or 
female-dominated, and that cover a spectrum of skills required to carry out the occupation. The 
vignette order was randomized. After each vignette, recruiters were asked how likely they were 
to invite someone for a job interview (on a scale from 0 to 10), and, regardless of the probability 
to invite him or her, to designate a monthly salary in Swiss francs, assuming the job was 
fulltime. 
 Our vignettes were made up of 11 dimensions including age, gender, nationality, civil 
status, children, type of education4 and work experience. This resulted in a vignette universe of 
5,529,600 vignettes per occupation, from which we drew an orthogonal (d-efficient) design of 
1080 per occupation.5 
 Not all respondents provided answers to the questions on all vignettes. Taking out non-
responses and restricting our sample to active recruiters, we are left with an analytical sample 
of 491 recruiters and 2834 vignettes – approximately 7.4 vignettes per respondent. 
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3.3 Method 
Table 1 summarises our analytical strategy by setting out the suitability of different 
survey types in testing our three hypotheses. To test the productivity hypothesis, we use a 
respondent-level panel fixed-effects model with the civil status (married or unmarried) as the 
independent variable. Fixed-effects account for unobserved heterogeneity and should therefore 
give us an idea of the changes that occur to wages after marriage – though they will not tell us 
whether the change is caused by marriage. To answer this question, we also use fixed-effects 
regression but with an added step: matching the never-married observations with those who 
marry at some point during the observation period, using pre-labour market variables for the 
matching: years of education, the prestige of the father’s job (Treiman scale), health 
satisfaction, and nationality (Swiss or non-Swiss). We also include the year of birth to account 
for potential cohort effects. We opt for entropy balancing to carry out the matching. Entropy 
balancing is a matching technique that calculates scalar weights to the treatment group which 
can then be used in a regression analysis (Hainmueller 2012). In this way fewer observations 
are discarded than in other matching techniques where individual observations are matched, 
leading to “orphan” observations which cannot be analysed. As a robustness check, all the 
matched analyses are replicated using nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, the results 
of which can be found in the appendix and which broadly conform with the results obtained by 
the entropy balancing analysis. 
 
Table 1: Analytical strategy summary – suitability of different survey types 	 Cross-section	 Panel	Fixed	
Effects	Regression	
Factorial	survey	
analysis	Productivity			(H1)	 Not	suitable		 Yes	–	once	selection	is	
accounted	for	
(matching)	
	
No	
Selection		(H2)	 Not	suitable		 Yes	–	comparison	of	residuals	in	
matched	and	
unmatched	
samples	
	
No	
Employer	preferences	(H3)	 Not	suitable		 No	 Yes	–	assuming	no	correlated	variables	
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The matching process has the benefit of creating a quasi-experimental design and 
therefore the possibility to assign causality: by making sure that all our observations are the 
same before they marry, any residual is likely caused by marriage either through productivity 
changes or a preference of employers for married men. As a consequence we can also measure 
selection: The difference between our unmatched results and the results with observations 
matched on pre-labour market characteristics will indicate how much of the difference is due 
to the selection of men on in higher wage tracks or with higher wage trajectories into marriage 
(Ludwig and Brüderl 2018, 747). 
Our interest lies in the evolution of salaries of married compared to unmarried men. As 
such, our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of hourly wages. We construct this 
variable from the annual wage and contractual working hours variable, or usual working hours 
variable where this is missing. We cap working hours at 60 per week to account for potential 
over-reporting of hours, and exclude potential outliers by excluding wages above CHF 136 per 
hour, as well as any wages below CHF 20 per hour6, corresponding to approximately the top 
and bottom 1% of the distribution. Inflation is controlled for by using 2015 constant Swiss 
Francs.  
 
The analytical model for both the matched and unmatched samples can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
Yit = β0 + β1CIVILit + β2AGEit + β3CHILDRENit + at  + εit       (t=1, 2, …T) 
 
where Y is the natural logarithm of hourly wages of an individual i at time t. Our 
dependent variable, CIVILit, is the time-varying dummy variable of the marital status (either 
never married or married) of an individual i at time t. AGEit is a covariate specifying the age of 
the individual. In our regression models, we include age in years as a covariate to account for 
increasing job experience and the fact that our observations occur across a period in the life 
course when human capital and salaries increase very quickly. CHILDRENit is a dummy 
variable of an individual’s parenthood status (whether they have children or not). While this is 
not a study of a fatherhood wage premium or penalty, marriage and fatherhood are closely 
linked, particularly in Switzerland where 75% of children are born to married parents (OFS 
2018). Moreover, given some of the literature argues that it is the transition to fatherhood rather 
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than the transition to marriage that affects wages (see Astone et al. 2010 for an overview), by 
including a parenthood variable we are able to ascertain whether or not the change is indeed 
linked to becoming a husband rather than becoming a father. at represents a set of time-variant 
unobserved characteristics that is perfectly correlated with all individual predictors, while εit 
represents the idiosyncratic standard error. We correct for the clustering of observations across 
waves by using clustered standard errors. 
 A critical reader may note that we introduce no further controls to our regression models 
beyond age, children and the variables used for the entropy balancing algorithm. This is a 
deliberate strategy to avoid controlling away meaningful results – over-control bias. The fact 
of being married may not directly lead to higher wages but rather filter through other 
mechanisms: a married man may work longer hours, have a more stable contract or be more 
likely to be considered a prospect for promotion than single men – all possible contributors to 
the marriage premium that would not be visible if controlled for. We thus choose to run our 
models without these controls in order to ensure we capture the full relationship between 
marriage and wages. 
 
We are left with the analysis of employer preferences, and to do so we turn to our survey 
experiment, which combines two key features that make it suited to the task: first, it surveys 
employers and human resources professionals directly, giving us a strong indication of their 
behaviours and thought processes. Second, by applying an experimental design whereby all 
variables are known to the researcher and uncorrelated with each other, the results are likely to 
be an expression of preference towards married men and not confounded with other variables. 
We again use a fixed-effects regression with civil status as the key independent variable. Here, 
the fixed-effects refer to the within-effect for survey respondents: we measure only the 
differences within respondents, and therefore take into account the varying rating threshold, 
and the fact that it is likely that respondents will compare the vignettes they rate to those 
previously rated. 3 civil status levels were possible – single, married and divorced – our analysis 
treats only the difference between single and married. As the candidates apply for different 
jobs, we use occupation and the interaction between occupation and civil status as controls. 
Although all dimensions are uncorrelated and should therefore have no impact on the results, 
we nevertheless also include education, nationality, and experience as controls to convince 
sceptical readers of our results. 
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 We take the natural log of monthly wages, to determine whether the marriage premium 
is expressed in terms of higher wages for married men than unmarried.7 As a check for our 
results, we take the likelihood, between 0 and 10, of being invited to a job interview, to see 
whether the premium expressed in terms of employers’ preferences for hiring married men over 
unmarried is similar to that of the wage premium. The general equation is expressed as: 
 
Yir = β0 + β1OCCir + β2CIVILir + β2OCCir*CIVILir + β3CONTROLSir + ar  + εir      (r=1, 2, …R) 
  
where  Yir  is either the logarithm of monthly wages for a vignette i evaluated by respondent r, 
or the likelihood of interview rating respondent r assigns vignette i. OCCir is a control for 
occupation, CIVILir is a categorical variable of civil status (either single, married, or divorced), 
OCCir*CIVILir is an interaction term and CONTROLSir is a vector of control variables. ar is a 
set of unobserved variables that correlate with all individual predictors. εir is the idiosyncratic 
random error, and we correct for clustering of observations within respondents by using robust 
standard errors. 
 
4. Panel data evidence for the male marriage premium 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 sets out the mean values for our data sample for the independent, dependent and 
control variables for the full sample, as well as for the group of married observations, and the 
group of unmarried observations, both weighted and unweighted, to show the effectiveness of 
the entropy balancing algorithm. 
 The first thing to note is that the entropy balancing is indeed effective: All the balancing 
variables are perfectly matched when weights are applied to the unmarried group. When this 
exercise is repeated for the nearest-neighbour matching results (see table A.3 in the appendix), 
the difference between the two groups reduces but does not disappear, again vindicating our 
choice of matching strategy. The nearest-neighbour matching also involved the dropping of 
some observations that are outliers in the sample, reducing the size of the analytical sample. 
Overall wages are high, with a near-CHF 3 gap between the married and unmarried group, 
reducing to a little over CHF 2 when weighted. While this seems small, for a full-time job of 
42 hours per week, this represents over CHF 6000 per year, or close to a month’s average wage 
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in favour of married men over unmarried. The two groups are otherwise remarkably similar, 
with generally only slight differences: the single men are slightly older and less educated but 
the difference in social origin is minute and there is almost no difference at all in terms of health 
satisfaction – the variable could be discarded and the analytical results would be largely 
unaffected. Interestingly, the married men group is slightly less Swiss than the unmarried – a 7 
percentage point gap – but both groups are significantly more Swiss than the resident population 
in Switzerland as a whole, suggesting our dataset does not do a very good job of reaching 
foreign residents in Switzerland. 
 With so much similarity between the two groups it is likely that much of the gap in 
wages seen here is linked to the marital status. To confirm this, we turn to our fixed-effects 
analysis of the data. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for SHP analysis 
Variable 
All 
observations Married 
Never 
married, 
unweighted 
Never 
married, 
weighted 
Married (in %) 88.30% - - - 
 
    
Average wage (CHF/hour) 45.31 44.59 43.19 43.98 
 
    
Age (years) 36.3 36.1 38.4 35.8 
 
    
Year of birth 1970 1971 1967 1971 
 
    
Years of education 14.9 15 14.1 15 
 
    
Health (satisfaction on 0-10 scale) 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 
 
    
Nationality (% Swiss) 89% 88% 95% 88% 
 
    
Social origin (position of father 
on 0-80 Treiman scale*): 
43.5 43.4 44.3 43.4 
N obs 3413 3013 400 400 
* Treiman scale is inverted: The lower the number, the higher the prestige of the occupation. 
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4.2 Fixed-effects regression analysis 
If the descriptive statistics confirm the existence of a wage premium for married men in 
Switzerland, we must resort to regression analysis to identify the relationship between this 
premium and civil status. Table 3 shows the male marriage premium for men aged 25 to 50 in 
Switzerland. The first model shows the results for the unmatched observations, including age 
as a covariate, while the second model reports the results for the matched subsets.  
In our raw models, containing only age as a covariate, we see a premium to married men 
of about 5.6%. This is a within-effect, meaning it measures the change over time in wages of 
each individual, and could therefore broadly be interpreted as a productivity effect, if no 
employer preferences towards married men are present and men do not positively select into 
marriage. This result is below other estimates found using panel data: Budig and Lim (2016), 
Killewald and Gough (2013) and Hersch and Stratton (2000) find marriage premiums in the 
order of 7-9% in the US, while in Germany, Barg and Beblo (2007) estimate a wage premium 
for married men of 9.5%.  This could be a case of more recent data reflecting a diminishing 
penalty, in line with Gray’s (1997) finding that the premium has been decreasing as more 
women join the workforce, or simply suggest that the marriage premium is of a lower order in 
Switzerland than in these countries. Nevertheless, our results confirm the trend demonstrated 
in the previous literature if not the magnitude. The age variable suggests that each additional 
year on the labour market adds 2% to wages, a figure which is confirmed by replicating the 
analysis with each year of age as a dummy variable. This “experience premium” of 2% a year 
seems a feasible figure, particularly given such a rise is built-in to many work contracts in the 
public sector in Switzerland. 
The 5.6% premium refers to a correlation between being married and higher wages. It 
does not take into account whether or not the premium may be caused by marriage, through 
either improved productivity or a preference of employers for married men, or if it results from 
married men being already on a higher earnings trajectory – the selection effect. Model 2 
disentangles this relationship by reweighting the analytical sample with entropy balancing, 
effectively making the group of never-married men and those who do marry across the same 
on a set of pre-labour market socio-economic characteristics. Any remaining premium should 
therefore be the direct result of the fact of being married, net of any selection effects. This 
model finds that the premium has been reduced to 2.5%, significant only at the p<0.1 level. 
This finding is in line with previous empirical research showing that selection accounts for 
between 50% and 80% of the premium (see Petersen et al. 2011, Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001). 
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Indeed, or results closely match those of Ludwig and Brüderl’s (2018: 762-763) longitudinal 
analysis of the premium in the US, which suggests that approximately half of the premium is 
due to either married men being in a higher wage track or on a faster growing wage trajectory, 
the remainder being not statistically significant. The age premium remains the same as in the 
unmatched model, lending further credibility to the results: a distortion in the age variable may 
have been a signal of a poor matching algorithm. This would suggest that in Switzerland at 
least, the selection of more productive men into marriage has a larger effect than productivity, 
or, possibly, employer preferences. 
In a further analysis, we control for parenthood status by introducing a dummy variable 
for whether or not an individual has children of his own. Including this variable results in a 
slight increase in the premium in both the matched and unmatched sample – indeed, in both 
samples having children is associated with a penalty, though the standard errors are quite large, 
notably in the matched sample. These results argue for a marriage premium independent of 
parenthood, which may in fact have a negative effect on men’s wages. 
 
Table 3: Wage premium for married men, SHP 
  		 Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
Dimension Level (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Marital status Married 0.056*** 0.025* 0.061*** 0.041*** 
(ref. never married)  (0.021) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) 
    
  
Age  0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
    
  
Children Yes   -0.055 -0.131*** 
(ref. no child)    (0.048) (0.029) 
    
  
  Individuals 628 
 Observations 3,413 
  R2 0.179 0.177 0.18 0.18 
 Note: Individual fixed-effects regressions on (log) wages for men. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
Observations in the matched sample are matched on social origin (Treiman scale), nationality, year of birth, years 
of education, health satisfaction. 
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Figure 1 graphically summarizes the results of our fixed-effects panel data analysis. 
With our matched samples showing wage premiums of 2.5 and 4.1% when children are 
excluded from and included in the analysis, respectively, and our unmatched samples showing 
premiums of 5.6 and 6.1%, the effect of selection on married men’s wages is in the order of 2 
and 3%. Some of this residual is likely due to productivity, while some may be a result of 
employers preferring married men over single. To delve further into the question of employer 
preferences impacting the male marriage premium, we turn to our survey experiment. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of male marriage premiums, matched compared to unmatched, with and 
without controls for children 
Source: Swiss Household panel, table 3 regressions (own calculation).
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5. Experimental evidence for the male marriage premium 
5.1 Fixed-effects analysis 
Our analysis of Swiss Household Panel data points to a male marriage premium of over 
5%, most of which is driven by selection of men with better wage trajectories into marriage. 
What is left may be due either to increased productivity on the part of married men, or 
favouritism on the part of employers for these workers. If any part of the male marriage 
premium is indeed due to the preferences of employers, we should expect to see this in our 
factorial survey. Table 4 shows the effect of marriage on the wages our sample of employers 
and recruiters consider adequate for male job candidates. The first model is a simple regression 
of civil status on wages, where we see a small premium of 1.3% for married men compared to 
single. This result would seem to be in line with those we found in our panel data analysis. 
 Our profiles, however, refer to three different occupations with differing job functions 
and cognitive and physical requirements, and therefore in Model 2 we control for occupation. 
Despite a small reduction in the size, we find that the premium for married men of 
approximately 1% becomes statistically significant at p<0.1. In a third model, we account for 
the fact that marriage may be seen differently in each of the three occupations by introducing 
an interaction term between occupation and civil status. Here we see an increase in the premium 
from the model without interaction terms, to a premium of 2% for the reference occupation of 
accountants. Introducing further controls in Model 4 results in no significant changes, as should 
be expected from a survey experiment.8 
The coefficients reported in Models 2-4 refer to the reference category of accountants. 
The interactions show us that there is indeed a difference between occupations in how civil 
status affects wages. Figure 2 illustrates these differences: a married HR assistant in fact 
receives a 1% wage penalty, while a married concierge receives a premium of 1.5%, though in 
these cases the 90% confidence interval crosses 0. 
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Table 4: Wage recommendations for men depending on their civil status 
Dimension Level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Marital status Married 0.013 0.009* 0.02* 0.019* 
(ref: unmarried)  (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) 
      
Occupation HR assistant  -0.18*** -0.167*** -0.167*** 
(ref: Accountant)   (0.01) (0.013) (0.013) 
      
 Concierge  -0.348*** -0.353*** -0.352*** 
   (0.008) (0.014) (0.014) 
      
Interaction terms HR assistant*Married   -0.031** -0.030** 
(ref: Acct, unmarried)    (0.014) (0.014) 
    
  
 Concierge*Married   -0.003 -0.003 
    (0.015) (0.015) 
      
Controls  No No Children All 
  	 Respondents 395 
 Observations 2,083 
  R2 0.001 0.6968 0.6993 0.7031 
Note: Respondent fixed-effects regressions on (log) wages for men. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
Additional controls in M4 include: children, nationality, education, experience; full M4 model is shown in the 
Appendix. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Figure 2: Wage recommendations for married men, by occupation (ref single) 
Note: Results from respondent fixed-effects regressions on (log) hourly wages for men, model with control and 
interaction terms. See the appendix for regression tables including the full models. 90% confidence intervals 
shown. 
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5.2 Further analyses and robustness checks 
Our factorial survey, then, shows small premiums for married men that do not confirm 
the large premiums otherwise seen in the literature (though they are in line with the smaller, 
weaker premiums we find for Swiss men in our panel data analysis), implying that employer 
preferences do not much affect the married wage premium. Our respondents, however, were 
also asked to rate the likelihood of inviting profiles to a job interview, a process which also 
expresses a preference for a certain type of candidate. Given that our wage regressions report 
large standard errors, we can use these likelihoods to interview values as a robustness check – 
if they also report preferences for married men, this is a strong indication of the presence of 
employer preferences in favour of married men. Table 5 reports the regression results for the 
likelihood to get a job interview dependent the on civil status. Here we see a preference of 0.2 
points for married men in the empty model, remaining similar when controls for occupation are 
added. However, adding an interaction term for civil status with occupation again complicates 
the story. 
 
Table 5: Probability to invite to a job interview (on a scale from 0 to 10) for men depending on 
their marital status 
Dimension Level Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Marital status Married 0.217* 0.237** 0.256* 0.242* 
(ref: unmarried)  (0.091) (0.083) (0.131) (0.132) 
      
Occupation HR assistant  -1.088*** -1.135*** -1.144*** 
(ref: Accountant)   (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) 
      
 Concierge  0.411*** 0.267 0.267 
   (0.103) (0.164) (0.163) 
      
Interaction terms HR assistant*Married   -0.171 -0.141 
(ref: Acct, 
unmarried) 
   (0.196) (0.197) 
    
  
 Concierge*Married   0.136 0.147 
    (0.206) (0.207) 
      
Controls   No No Children All 
 Respondents 491 
 Observations 2,665 
  R2 0.003 0.145 0.149 0.1541 
Note: Respondent fixed-effects regressions on likelihood to invite to a job interview for men. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Figure 3 shows that although married men are generally preferred over single, this 
preference varies in size from 0.1 point for HR assistants (where the 90% confidence interval 
crosses 0), through to 0.24 points for accountants and 0.39 points for building concierges – for 
comparison, this is a greater preference shown than that for Swiss men over Turkish candidates 
(0.26 points). There may be several explanations for the fact that the values for hiring 
preferences are greater than those for wages – expressing a preference for inviting to a job 
interview for fictive profiles may be a simpler process for recruiters than allocating wages, or, 
employers prefer married men over single but are reticent to express this in offering higher 
wages. Either way, the results point to a preference for married men by employers, reinforcing 
the notion that employers are prone to favouring married men, at least at the higher and lower 
ends of the job prestige scale. 
 
Figure 3: Probability of inviting for a job interview (on scale from 0 to 10) for married men, 
by occupation (ref unmarried) 
  
Note: Results from respondent fixed-effects regressions on probability of inviting candidate for a job interview, 
model with control and interaction terms. See the appendix for regression tables including the full models. 
90% confidence intervals shown. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion 
Wage gaps exist not just between genders but within them. Just as mothers earn less 
than non-mothers (Gangl and Ziefle 2009, Oesch et al. 2017), single men tend to earn less than 
their married counterparts. These within-gender differences – penalties for mothers, premiums 
for husbands, form a large portion of the mechanism behind the overall wage gap, and 
understanding them is key to being able to act upon wage discrepancies in a meaningful way. 
 This paper has made a twofold contribution to the discussion of the latter of these 
phenomena, the male marriage premium. First, we confirm the existence of the male marriage 
premium in Switzerland using national panel data. We find a raw premium of between 5 and 
6%, depending on controls for children – smaller than that reported in much of the existing 
literature but nevertheless significant. This decreases to between 2 and 3% when we match 
individuals who remain unmarried across the period of observation with individuals who start 
single but marry during the period of observation, arguing for a strong selection effect. In terms 
of our initial hypotheses, we cannot confirm H1 – that marriage makes men more productive – 
but H2 – that more productive men select into marriage – is confirmed by the data. The data 
also confirms that the marriage premium for men exists whether or not children are controlled 
for in the analysis. 
Following our panel data analysis, we use a survey experiment amongst Swiss recruiters 
to ascertain how much of the residual is due to employer preferences. We find that recruiters 
give a 1-2% premium to married men, but that this varies based on occupation. This does not 
match the wage penalties reported in the previous literature, suggesting that employer 
preferences play, at most, a very small role in the male marriage premium – although it does 
conform with the lower-end residuals from our panel data analysis. Our third hypothesis (H3) 
– that employers prefer married men and therefore offer them a higher wage – is partially 
confirmed, with this being the case for occupations at the top (accountant) and bottom 
(concierge) of the workforce, but not in the middle (HR assistant). The effects are also quite 
small. 
Importantly, however, we uncover that wages are only part of the employer preferences 
story. We find somewhat stronger preferences expressed for married men over single in terms 
of the probability of inviting for a job interview – in the case of concierges, up to half a point 
on an 11-point scale, comparable, and in fact sometimes larger to the premium received by 
being a Swiss applicant as opposed to a foreigner. This suggests that rather than rewarding 
married men in terms of the salaries offered to them, employers express their preferences earlier 
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– at the point of interview – but also suggests that employers do express a small preference for 
married men. This is a unique contribution made by this paper, as modelling outcomes for yet-
to-be hired profiles is very difficult using survey data and while possible with audit studies, in 
this context only an indication of whether or not a profile would be invited to a job interview is 
possible. 
 We see vast differences between occupations, with the higher (accountant) and lower 
(concierge) prestige jobs more affected than the middle occupation (HR assistant). There is 
evidence that social norms of the good working husband and stay-at-home-wife are stronger in 
higher-prestige jobs (Carlsson 2011, Berghammer 2014), while in lower-prestige jobs, 
reliability is valued, and marriage sends a strong reliability signal to many employers of lower 
skilled jobs (Schwartz 1990), which seems to be reinforced by the results of this analysis. 
 
Our analysis is not without its drawbacks. Concerning the survey experiment, it is clear that 
while such a setup has the benefit of estimating effects without confounders, given its fictional 
grounding, the results can at best be considered stated intentions and not necessarily predictions 
of actual behaviour – though research by Hainmueller et al. (2015) suggests that responses 
given in an experimental context are in fact quite close to real-world behaviour. Our estimates 
are also likely to be lower-bound – research by Fuller (2017) into the presence of a motherhood 
wage penalty in Canada suggests that a professional HR department decreases the penalty. We 
would expect the same to hold true for marriage premiums, given the employer preferences 
mechanisms are similar. Given that most Swiss work in SMEs, which often do not have a 
dedicated HR department, it is likely that the actual effects of employer preferences are higher 
than those we find in our survey experiment, which is heavily biased towards large enterprises 
in urban areas which are more progressive and have vastly superior employment and family 
services than rural areas.  
  
There is a trend in social commentary to suggest that as living arrangements become more 
flexible, and cohabitation without marriage becomes more acceptable in most societies, 
judgements based on marital status may become a thing of the past (Gray 1997). This paper 
confirms that trend to a degree by finding a smaller premium than much of the previous 
literature, largely driven by selection. Employers attribute slightly higher wages to married men 
than single, suggesting that employer preferences, based either on statistical discrimination or 
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social norms in Switzerland do still have some (small) impact on wage decisions when it comes 
to civil status. Moreover, we find that employers also express a preference for married men at 
the point of interview, and that this “interview premium” is stronger than the wage one in our 
survey experiment analysis. In other words, it is harder for unmarried men to get a “foot in the 
door” than their married counterparts. While the marriage premium may be diminishing in 
terms of wages, it is important to also consider other areas in which married men may be 
favoured. Using analytical strategies that can identify causal relationships and analyse 
employers directly is an important contribution to understanding, and therefore being able to 
better address, such questions. 
 
7. Notes 
1 Of the three main official languages of Switzerland, German is spoken by 63% of the 
population, French by 23% and Italian by 8% (OFS 2016). A small number of Italian speakers 
responded, mostly in German. 
2 82% of these active recruiters claimed “decisive influence” over the hiring process in their 
firm. 
3 Other large urban areas, including Basel and the Lake Geneva region, were 
underrepresented, as well as rural German-speaking regions and Ticino, the main Italian-
speaking canton of Switzerland. Half of the respondents were employed in organisations of 
over 250 workers, and a quarter in organisations of over 1050 employees. In reality, most 
Swiss work in small and medium enterprises. The public sector is also overrepresented 
compared to the Swiss labour market. 
4 The Swiss education system places a heavy focus on vocational education and so the 
distinction between vocational and academic degrees is well known and understood by 
employers. 
5 Tables of all vignette dimensions and levels, and correlations between the dimensions, are 
available in the appendix. Some dimensions (nationality, hobbies, experience, type of 
education, participation in labour market programmes, channel of application) are of no direct 
interest to our study but are included to further other research interests and to make our 
profiles more realistic. 
6 Switzerland has no federal statutory minimum wage but wages below CHF 20 per hour are 
extremely rare outside of in-firm apprenticeships and internships. 
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7 The wage distribution can be found in the appendix and shows that median wages in the 
sample (6000 Swiss francs overall, CHF 7200 for accountants, CHF 6000 for HR assistants 
and CHF 5000 for caretakers) are plausible and correspond closely to the median monthly 
wage in the Swiss private sector of CHF 6189 (OFS 2015). 
8 Full regression tables, including all controls, can be found in the appendix.
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Appendix 
Figure A.1: Example vignettes (translated from French/German) 
 
You will now be asked to evaluate 12 fictional candidates for 3 different jobs. For each 
candidate, please give the likelihood that you would invite him or her to a job interview (0 = 
very unlikely, 10 = very likely) as well as the monthly salary you would pay them. All the 
candidates completed their compulsory schooling in Switzerland, have been unemployed for 
6 months, and lost their previous job due to the closure of their firm. 
 
 
HR Assistant job candidate: 
 
Application:	 One	of	your	employees	had	recommended	Mr	Ismail	Üstgül	for	the	vacant	position.		
Personal	details:	 He	is	45	years	old,	has	2	school-aged	children	and	is	unmarried.		
Education:	 He	has	completed	his	upper-secondary	schooling.		
Professional	experience:	 He	has,	amongst	other	work	experience,	8	years	of	Human	Resources	experience	in	the	private	sector.		
Language	skills:	 Mr	Üstgül	speaks	French	and	Turkish.		
Hobby:	 He	is	a	committee	member	of	Türkgücü,	a	Turkish	cultural	association.		
Further	information:	 He	is	currently	completing	training	in	human	resources	management,	paid	for	by	the	Regional	Employment	Office.	
 
 
Invite	for	an	interview:	 Monthly	gross	salary	(100%):	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 ________	CHF	
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Accountant job candidate: 
 
Application:	 A	few	days	ago,	you	received	a	spontaneous	application	from	Ms	Nathalie	Rochat.		
Personal	details:	 She	is	40	years	old,	has	one	school-aged	child,	and	is	divorced.		
Education:	 She	completed	professional	business	studies	and	has	a	diploma	in	accounting.		
Professional	experience:	 She	has,	amongst	other	work	experience,	8	years	of	accounting	experience	in	the	public	sector.			
Language	skills:	 Ms	Rochat	speaks	French	
 
 
Invite	for	an	interview:	 Monthly	gross	salary	(100%):	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 ________	CHF	
Building caretaker job candidate: 
 
Application:	 The	Regional	Unemployment	Office	has	sent	you	the	application	of	Mr	Pedro	Martinez.		
Personal	details:	 He	is	45	years	old,	has	no	children	and	is	married.		
Education:	 He	completed	an	apprenticeship	as	a	commercial	building	maintenance	specialist.		
Professional	experience:	 He	has,	amongst	other	work	experience,	8	years	of	building	maintenance	experience	in	the	private	sector.		
Language	skills:	 Mr	Martinez	speaks	German	and	Spanish.		
Hobby:	 In	his	free	time,	he	volunteers	as	a	driver	for	the	Red	Cross.		
Further	information:	 Alongside	his	job	search,	he	has	a	part-time	job	as	a	sales	assistant	in	a	retail	business.	
 
 
Invite	for	an	interview:	 Monthly	gross	salary	(100%):	 0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 ________	CHF	
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Figure A.2: Wage distribution for different job candidates 
 
Notes: N respondents 418 (active recruiters only), N vignettes 4137. 
 
Table A.1: variables included in the vignettes of the factorial survey experiment 
Dimension (variable) Levels (values) 
Gender* Male, female 
Age 35, 40, 45, 50, 55 
Children 0, 1, 2, 3 
Civil Status Unmarried, married, divorced 
Type of education Vocational, general 
Type of work Experience Private sector, public sector 
Nationality*  Swiss, Spanish, Turkish, Polish 
Mother tongue German/French German/French plus an additional language 
Participation in active labour 
market program** 
None, training program, occupational 
program (matched and unmatched), subsidy, 
temporary employment 
Channel of Application 
Advertisement, referral from current 
employee, unsolicited application, regional 
employment service 
Hobby** 
None, swim coaching, board member of a 
Swiss/foreign cultural association, volunteer 
for Red Cross driving service 
*  These dimensions were denoted by the names of applicants 
**  “None” implies that this dimension did not appear in the vignette. 
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Table A.2: correlations between vignette dimensions (Cramer’s V)  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 ALMP 1           
2 Channel of applic. 0.028 1          
3 Gender 0.015 0.02 1         
4 Age 0.023 0.017 0.018 1        
5 Children 0.017 0.017 0.034 0.024 1       
6 Civil status 0.028 0.01 0.015 0.036 0.011 1      
7 Hobby 0.029 0.027 0.015 0.024 0.021 0.011 1     
8 Education 0.019 0.021 0.003 0.017 0.009 0.017 0.007 1    
9 Nationality 0.02 0.016 0.013 0.021 0.022 0.019 0.027 0.025 1   
10 Experience 0.013 0.016 0.003 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.015 0 0.013 1  
11 Language 0.022 0.015 0.001 0.009 0.018 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.014 0.018 1 
No correlation is statistically significant at p<0.05 
 
 
Table A.3: Descriptive statistics of SHP analysis (nearest-neighbour replication) 
Variable 
All 
observations Married 
Never 
married, 
before 
matching 
Married, 
after 
matching 
Never 
married, 
after 
matching 
Married (in %) 88.30% - - - - 
 
     
Average wage (CHF/hour) 45.31 44.59 43.91 46 46.2 
 
     
Age (years) 36.3 36.1 38 36.6 37.3 
 
     
Year of birth 1970 1971 1967 1970 1969 
 
     
Years of education 14.9 15 14.1 14.9 15.8 
 
     
Health (satisfaction on 0-10 scale) 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.1 7.9 
 
     
Nationality (% Swiss) 89% 88% 95% 94% 92% 
 
     
Social origin (position of father 
on 0-80 Treiman scale*:) 
43.5 43.4 44.4 44 44.3 
N obs 3413 3013 350 2557 324 
* Treiman scale is inverted: The lower the number, the higher the prestige of the occupation. 
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Table A.4: Wage premium for married men, SHP (nearest-neighbour matching replication) 
  		 Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
Dimension Level (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Marital status Married 0.056*** 0.036** 0.061*** 0.044*** 
(ref. single)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
    
  
Age  0.021*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
  
Children Yes   -0.055 -0.094*** 
(ref. no child)    (0.048) (0.046) 
    
  
  Individuals 628 504 628 504 
 Observations 3,413 2,881 3,413 2,881 
  R2 0.179 0.181 0.18 0.183 
 Note: Individual fixed-effects regressions on (log) wages for men. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.  
Observations in the matched sample are matched on social origin (Treiman scale), nationality, year of birth, years 
of education, health satisfaction. Nearest-neighbour matching carried out with replacement: control observations 
can be matched more than once. 
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Table A.5: Wage recommendations for men, depending on their marital status 
Dimension Level   
Marital status Married 0.019* 
(ref: unmarried)  (0.011) 
   
Occupation HR assistant -0.167*** 
(ref: Accountant)  (0.013) 
   
 Concierge -0.352*** 
  (0.014) 
   
Education Higher 0.019*** 
(ref: lower education)  (0.005) 
   
Nationality Spanish -0.009 
(ref: Swiss)  (0.007) 
   
 Polish -0.01 
  (0.007) 
   
 Turkish -0.010* 
  (0.006) 
   
Experience Private 0.007 
(ref: Public sector)  (0.005) 
   
Interaction terms HR assistant*Married -0.03** 
(ref: Acct, unmarried)  (0.014) 
   
 Concierge*Married 0.003 
  (0.015) 
   
Children 1 child 0.005 
(ref: no child)  (0.007) 
   
 2 children -0.01 
  (0.007) 
   
 3 children 0.003 
    (0.007) 
 Respondents 395 
 Observations 2,083 
  R2 0.7031 
Note: Respondent fixed-effects regressions on (log) wages for men. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A.6: Probability to invite to a job interview (on a scale from 0 to 10) for men depending 
on their marital status 
Dimension Level   
Marital status Married 0.242* 
(ref: unmarried)  (0.132) 
   
Occupation HR assistant -1.144*** 
(ref: Accountant)  (0.15) 
   
 Concierge 0.267 
  (0.163) 
   
Education Higher 0.129* 
(ref: lower education)  (0.07) 
   
Nationality Spanish -0.046 
(ref: Swiss)  (0.092) 
   
 Polish -0.159* 
  (0.088) 
   
 Turkish -0.26*** 
  (0.09) 
   
Experience Private 0.046 
(ref: Public sector)  (0.075) 
   
Interaction terms HR assistant*Married -0.141 
(ref: Acct, unmarried)  (0.197) 
  
 
 Concierge*Married 0.147 
  (0.207) 
   
Children 1 child -0.112 
(ref: no child)  (0.108) 
   
 2 children -0.121 
  (0.109) 
   
 3 children -0.079 
    (0.102) 
 Respondents 491 
 Observations 2,665 
  R2 0.1541 
Note: Respondent fixed-effects regressions on likelihood to invite to a job interview for men. Clustered standard 
errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
